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COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FELONY
CONVICTION IN ILLINOIS
JOHN F. DECKER*
When a person is charged with a serious crime, the first concern
usually is the possible penal sanctions involved: imprisonment, condi-
tional discharge, fines, and the like. However, in Illinois, many collat-
eral consequences are possible as a result of a felony conviction. This
article will summarize the additional disabilities which a person con-
victed of committing a felony may be required to face.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Past reactions to crime have shaped in many ways the adverse con-
sequences imposed upon convicted persons today. A logical first step
in the exploration of current disabilities which result from criminal
convictions is a brief historical perspective of the development of these
collateral consequences.
The early Germanic tribes imposed a penalty of outlawry on those
convicted of certain serious crimes.' Under this concept, the offender
was banished from the social community and deprived of all of his
rights. His possessions were forfeited, his wife was considered to be a
widow, and his children were considered orphans.2 By violating the
law, the criminal was regarded as having declared war on the commu-
nity. 3 The community had the right to retaliate against the offender
without fear of punishment, using whatever means it considered appro-
priate. As a result, the criminal not only lost all proprietary rights and
privileges, but frequently his life.4
In the latter days of Greek and Roman civilizations, infamy was
common among convicted criminals.5 When a person was declared in-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; J.D., Creighton University; LL.M.,
J.S.D., New York University.
1. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Convictions and Their Removal: 4 Comparative
Study, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347, 350 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Damaska]. The early
Romans also imposed outlawry, but it was applied in the limited form of proclaiming a convict a
treasoner. Id at 350-51.
2. Id at 350.
3. Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV.
929, 942 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Collateral Consequences].
4. Id
5. Damaska, supra note 1, at 351.
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famous, he lost all of the highly valued rights which enabled citizens to
influence public affairs. Among these were the right to attend assem-
blies, to vote, to make speeches, to hold public office, to appear in
court, and to serve in the army.6 The right to serve in the army, at the
time, was a high honor and a source of prestige in the community. 7
Infamy, as practiced in the Roman Republic in response to crimi-
nal convictions, included other specific disabilities such as the loss of
citizenship and the right to have a trade, forfeiture of property, and the
loss of inheritance rights.8 Thereafter, imposition of these types of pen-
alties became common throughout Europe, and most United States
jurisdictions continue today to impose a variety of specific disqualifica-
tions upon persons convicted of certain crimes,9 although they are gen-
erally not as extreme as their earlier counterparts.
In medieval times, the continental countries developed the concept
of civil death. When civil death was imposed, the convicted criminal
experienced the same legal consequences as if he had suffered actual
physical death.' 0 The convict forfeited all political rights and familial
rights, including the right to transmit property by will or intestacy.
Also, the convict had his property confiscated by the government. Civil
death continued to be imposed in France and the Germanic countries
until the mid-nineteenth century.' 1 A modified form of civil death is
still a consequence of conviction in a few United States jurisdictions. 12
However, it has been declared not to exist in the absence of a statute
specifically providing for it.'3 Five states currently have statutory vari-
ations of civil death, 14 but the earlier drastic penalties have been modi-




9. See Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 950. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. 6, § 3
(forfeiture and restoration of electoral privileges); DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (right to hold public
office); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1683(4) (1956) (right to carry on a trade).
10. Damaska, supra note 1, at 351-52.
11. Id
12. D. RUDENSTINE, THE RIGHTS OF Ex-OFFENDERS 16 (1979).
13. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nerac, 35 Cal. 392 (1868); Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E.
794 (1888); David v. Laning, 85 Tex. 39, 19 S.W. 846 (1892).
14. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.05.070-11.05.080 (1970); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-310 to 18-311 (1948);
N.J. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 79, 79a (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 65, 66 (West
1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1969).
15. See, e.g., Holmes v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274 (1927) which noted that: "In general,
the American Courts. . .tend to get away from the rigorous features of the common law." Id at
414, 113 So. at 276. The Holmes court recognized the limited statutory provision regarding civil
death which allowed the convict to write a will within six months after sentence. It reached this
decision even though the common law would have considered the convict dead at the time of
conviction for purposes of descent and distribution of the convict's property.
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Moreover, in each of the jurisdictions now authorizing civil death, the
disability remains in effect only during the period of the offender's im-
prisonment. '
6
The criminal law in early England reflected a concept similar to
the ancient practice of outlawry, known as attainder, which was im-
posed on lawbreakers convicted of a felony or treason. ' 7 Attainted per-
sons forfeited their property to the crown, and they lost many civil
rights such as the right to bring suit, the right to appear in court as a
witness or as a juror, and the right to hold public office.' 8 They also
suffered corruption of blood.' 9 Attainder continued to be imposed in
England until 1870.20 Although the American colonies imposed certain
civil disabilities under the English procedure of attainder, 2' attainder
and its accompanying incidents of forfeiture and corruption have gen-
erally been prohibited in the United States by constitutional provi-
sions.22
Illinois law mirrors the historical development of collateral conse-
quences of a conviction. Although civil death has never been imposed
in Illinois, the current specific disabilities which are statutorily imposed
on convicted criminals in the state are rooted in the practices of infamy
and attainder.
TERMINOLOGY
Most of the specific disabilities imposed by Illinois statutes refer to
"conviction" or "felonies," or "infamous crimes" or "crimes involving
moral turpitude. ' 23 An exploration of the meanings of these terms is
necessary before the disabilities themselves are discussed.
In Illinois, conviction is defined by statute as "a judgment of con-
16. The Alaska statute is typical. It provides that:
A judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term less than life suspends the
civil rights of the person sentenced, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts,
authority or power during the term or duration of imprisonment.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.070 (1970) (emphasis added).
17. Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 943.
18. Id
19. Id Under this doctrine, the attainted felon's blood was considered to be corrupt; he
could not pass his estate on to his heirs. Land tenure was based on an implied condition of good
behavior, and the felon's act was viewed as a breach of this condition. Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y.
317, 323-24, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (1888).
20. Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 942.
21. S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 26 (2d ed. 1973).
22. The current Illinois constitutional provision that "[n]o conviction shall work corruption
of blood or forfeiture of estate" clearly reflects this position. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
23. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-5(b) (1977) which provides that:
A person convicted of a felony shall be ineligible to hold an office created by the Consti-
tution of this state. ...
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viction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or
finding of guilty of an offense .... -24 In practice, the meaning is not
as certain. For the purpose of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,25 a
defendant placed on probation is not considered to have suffered a con-
viction, 26 but a defendant who admits guilt in a probation revocation
proceeding is regarded as having been convicted. 27 A finding of proba-
ble cause at a preliminary examination cannot be counted as a convic-
tion, although such may occur later.28 Also, a finding of guilt by a
military court-martial is not considered to be the equivalent of a con-
viction for civil disability purposes.29 Finally, when a defendant is
charged with one offense, but is eventually found guilty at trial of a
lesser offense included within the original charge, no conviction results
on the greater offense. 30
There are different interpretations as to when a conviction actually
occurs. Under the Unified Code of Corrections, 31 conviction refers to a
determination of guilt even when no formal judgment is entered. 32
Similarly, failure to impose a sentence does not vacate the conviction. 33
When the defendant appeals the verdict or finding of guilty, the judg-
ment remains in effect until it is reversed. The pendency of an appeal
does not stay the attachment of the conviction.34
Under Illinois law, a "felony" is defined as being "an offense for
which a sentence to death or to a term of imprisonment in a peniten-
24. Id § 2-5. The conviction concept is discussed in D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DE-
TERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to 122-7 (1977).
26. Illinois v. DuMontelle, 71 I. 2d 157, 374 N.E.2d 205 (1978) (probation is considered to
be in the nature of a continuance).
27. See Illinois v. Pier, 51 111. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289 (1972).
28. Illinois v. Tate, 47 I11. App. 3d 33, 361 N.E.2d 748 (1977).
29. Getz v. Getz, 332 Ill. App. 364, 75 N.E.2d 530 (1947).
30. For example, if the defendant is charged with pandering, a felony, and is convicted of the
lesser included offense of soliciting for a prostitute, a misdemeanor, the solicitation conviction
serves as an acquittal on the pandering charge. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4(a) (1977). See
also Illinois v. Gray, 69 Ill. 2d 44, 370 N.E.2d 797 (1977) (conviction of contempt for violation of
protective order bars subsequent prosecution for aggravated battery and attempted murder arising
out of the same conduct).
However, if the conviction is based on a guilty plea to the lesser offense, there is no finding-
either conviction or acquittal-on the greater offense. Illinois v. McCutcheon, 68 IlI. 2d 101, 106,
368 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1977).
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1008 (1977).
32. See id § 1005-1-5 (1977). See also 1975 Op. ATr'y GEN. No. S-966, which indicates that
a conviction refers not only to entry of a judgment, but also to the determination of guilt even if
no judgment is ever entered.
33. Illinois v. Akins, 43 Ill. App. 3d 943, 358 N.E.2d 3 (1976) (fact that no sentence was
imposed does not mean there has been no conviction).
34. Illinois v. Bey, 42 Il. 2d 139, 246 N.E.2d 287 (1969).
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tiary for one year or more is provided."' 35 Thus, incarceration for less
than a year would not fall within the definition of a felony and, accord-
ingly, would be treated as a misdemeanor. In addition, if the statute
under which the conviction is obtained provides for discretionary sen-
tencing of pentitentiary imprisonment only, or fine only, or both fine
and imprisonment, the offense is a misdemeanor rather than a felony. 36
Infamous crimes, according to the Illinois statutes, "are the of-
fenses of arson, bigamy, bribery, burglary, deviate sexual assault, for-
gery, incest or aggravated incest, indecent liberties with a child,
kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, murder, perjury, rape, robbery,
sale of narcotic drugs, subordination of perjury and theft if the punish-
ment imposed is imprisonment in the penitentiary. '37 It is unclear
whether this is an exhaustive list of the crimes considered to be infa-
mous in Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court held that whether a crime
is infamous depends "not upon the common law or the court's view of
its moral aspects, but upon the statute. '38 However, more recent Illi-
nois opinions-all concerning eligibility to hold public office-indicate
that the determination of what constitutes an infamous crime is open to
judicial interpretation. 39 The standard used in these later cases has
been whether the crime falls within the general classification of being
inconsistent with commonly accepted principles of honesty and de-
cency.4° Under this interpretation, both felonies and misdemeanors
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-7 (1977). For a listing of the offenses classified as felonies in
Illinois, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, Table IV (Smith-Hurd 1973) (table of classification of of-
fenses). Under present Illinois law, the Illinois Department of Corrections has the power to desig-
nate the institutions which comprise the state penitentiary system. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-
2-2(c) (1977).
36. Illinois v. Bain, 359 Ill. 455, 470, 195 N.E. 42, 49 (1935). The definition adopted in this
case provided that a felony was "an offense punishable with death or by imprisonment in the
penitentiary." Id at 470, 195 N.E. at 49. Since this differs from the current definition only in that
the present code specifies imprisonment in a penitentiary for "one year or more," the reasoning of
Bain and its characterization of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors remains valid today. Illinois
v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 403, 244 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1968).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-1 (1977).
38. Illinois v. Green, 292 Ill. 351, 356, 127 N.E. 50, 52 (1920). Accord, Illinois v. Kirkpatrick,
413 Ill. 595, 110 N.E.2d 519 (1953); Illinois v. Russell, 245 I11. 268, 91 N.E. 1075 (1910); Christie v.
Illinois, 206 III. 337, 69 N.E. 33 (1903).
39. Illinois ex rel Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 358 U.S.
828 (1958) (federal income tax evasion held to be infamous); Illinois ex rel Ryan v. Coles, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 807, 381 N.E.2d 990 (1978) (extortion held to be infamous); Illinois ex rel Symonds v.
Gualano, 97 Ill. App. 2d 248, 240 N.E.2d 467 (1968) (mail fraud held to be infamous); Illinois ex
rel. Ward v. Tomek, 54 Ill. App. 2d 197, 203 N.E.2d 744 (1964) (conspiracy to defraud township
held to be infamous).
40. Illinois ex rel Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill. 2d 520, 534, 150 N.E.2d 168, 176, cert. denied,
358 U.S 828 (1958). Accord, Illinois ex rel. Symonds v. Gualano, 97 Ill. App. 2d 248, 254, 240
N.E.2d 467, 470 (1968); Illinois ex rel. Ward v. Tomek, 54 Ill. App. 2d 197, 202, 203 N.E.2d 744,
747 (1964).
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can be classified as infamous.41
The Illinois Supreme Court has defined "moral turpitude" as
"anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty or good
morals .... -42 This definition is quite broad and open to subjective
interpretation. Some offenses which the courts have found to involve
breaches of moral turpitude are fraud-related strictures, 43 illegal con-
version by an attorney of a client's money,44 illegally trafficking in nar-
cotics, 45 tax evasion,46 and failure to report for induction into the
armed services. 47
In addition to questions arising in the process of defining the terms
of the disabling statutes, two other issues are often presented. It is fre-
quently necessary to determine whether a conviction which occurred
outside the jurisdiction will activate Illinois' disabling statutes. If it
will, it must be resolved whether the laws of the foreign convicting ju-
risdiction or the disqualifying jurisdiction will be used to characterize
the crime under the disqualifying statute. Under Illinois case law, spe-
cific disability provisions are applicable to foreign convictions 48 and
the offender's criminal conduct is to be scrutinized by Illinois courts for
characterization. 49
SPECIFIC DISABILITIES IN ILLINOIS
Right to Vote
The voting franchise, one of the fundamental guarantees provided
by the United States Constitution,50 does not extend to protect con-
victed felons' access to the ballot box. In Richardson v. Ramirez,5 the
United States Supreme Court indicated that the decision of whether to
41. Illinois ex re. Ward v. Tomek, 54 Ill. App. 2d 197, 200, 203 N.E.2d 744, 746 (1964).
42. In re Needham, 364 Il. 65, 70, 4 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1936).
43. Inre Teitelbaum, 13 Ill. 2d 586, 150 N.E.2d 873, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958) (federal
income tax evasion).
44. In re Reiger, 402 Il. 483, 84 N.E.2d 439 (1949).
45. Fortman v. Aurora Civil Serv. Comm'n, 37 I11. App. 3d 548, 346 N.E.2d 20 (1976).
46. In re Revzan, 33 IlI. 2d 197, 210 N.E.2d 519 (1965).
47. In re Pontarelli, 393 IlL. 310, 66 N.E.2d 83 (1946).
48. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 1 (1977) and notes 62-74 and accompanying text infra
(evidence of prior convictions allowed for purposes of impeachment). See also Illinois ex rel.
Keenan v. McGuane, 13 IUI. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1958); Illinois ex
rel Ryan v. Coles, 64 Ill. App. 3d 807, 881 N.E.2d 990 (1978); Illinois v. Cordovano, 94 Ill. App.
2d 106, 236 N.E.2d 374 (1968); Illinois v. Trent, 85 I11. App. 2d 157, 228 N.E.2d 535 (1967).
49. Illinois ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 358 U.S.
828 (1958); Illinois v. Kirkpatrick, 413 Ill. 595, 110 N.E.2d 519 (1953); Illinois v. Trent, 85 I11. App.
2d 157, 228 N.E.2d 535 (1967).
50. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964).
51. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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allow voting rights to persons who had been convicted of a felony and
had completed their sentences was one within the discretion of the state
legislatures.52 In Richardson, the Court upheld a California statute
which disenfranchised all persons previously convicted of an infamous
crime.
Illinois has chosen to adopt both constitutional and statutory pro-
visions disenfranchising convicts during the time they are under sen-
tence of confinement in a jail or correctional institution. 53 Persons
serving a sentence of periodic imprisonment or persons on conditional
discharge, probation, or parole are not considered to be in confine-
ment,54 but those on furlough or on work release are and, accordingly,
they may not vote.5 5 Furthermore, the Illinois statute does not deny
the franchise to those who are being held prior to trial on nonbailable
offenses or who cannot raise the necessary bail.56
Although someone being held in pre-trial detention is apparently
not prohibited from voting by statutory provisions, he would have diffi-
culty in exercising his right to vote because the Illinois election statutes
do not include incarcerated persons among those qualifying for absen-
tee ballots.57 An equal protection challenge to the absentee ballot stat-
ute was presented to the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Board of
Election Commissioners. 58 The Court in McDonald found no constitu-
tional infirmity in the statutory omission, noting that "many other
classes of Illinois citizens [are] not covered by the absentee provisions,
for whom voting may be extremely difficult, if not practically impossi-
ble.' '59 The Court also indicated that the detainees had not been totally
precluded from voting because:
[T]he record is barren of any indication that the State might not, for
instance, possibly furnish the jails with special polling booths or fa-
cilities on election day, or provide guarded transportaton to the polls
themselves for certain inmates, or entertain motions for temporary
reductions in bail to allow some inmates to get to the polls on their
own.60
52. Id at 55-56.
53. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 2; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-5(c) (1977).
54. 1976 Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. S-1056.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 3-5 (1977).
56. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-08 (1969).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 19-1 to 19-4 (1977). The statute recognizes four categories of
persons eligible for absentee ballots: 1) those absent from the county of their residence, 2) the
physically incapacitated, 3) those unable to poll on the appointed day because of observance of
religious holidays, and 4) poll watchers in foreign precincts.
58. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
59. Id at 809-10.
60. Id at 808 n.6.
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The appellant in Illinois ex rel St. George v. Woods61 took the
Supreme Court's words in McDonald literally. While awaiting a pre-
liminary hearing, he filed a motion for release on his own recognizance
or, in the alternative, for a reduction in bail to enable him to go to the
polls to vote in a primary election. When the motion was denied, he
asked for the provision of polling booths or other suitable facilities in
the jail. This request was also refused. The detainee subsequently filed
a petition in the state court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was
dismissed. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court did not reach the
constitutional issues of denial of equal protection and due process since
it ruled that appellant's claims were not jurisdictional and therefore his
habeas corpus petition was not cognizable and had been properly de-
nied.62 Hence, the constitutional right of detainees to vote is still open
to debate in Illinois.
Judicial Rights
It is now clearly recognized that an incarcerated felon has a right
of access to judicial remedies. In Bounds v. Smith,63 the Supreme
Court characterized the rights of access as a fundamental right emanat-
ing from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 64 and
held that this right required prison officials to provide all prisoners with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law.65
While the right of access to the courts encompasses the right to
bring an immediate challenge against the conviction which is the basis
of the incarceration, 66 this right does not translate into an absolute right
to appear in court to pursue any type of civil action.67 Thus, while a
prisoner challenging his conviction may have a right to appear in court
to offer evidence in circumstances where the court reviewing his convic-
tion believes he has not already enjoyed a full and fair fact hearing on
his claim, 68 a prisoner's interest in making court appearances to pursue
civil actions unrelated to his conviction will be balanced against the
61. 47 Il. 2d 261, 265 N.E.2d 164 (1970).
62. Id at 262, 265 N.E. at 165.
63. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
64. Id at 828.
65. Id For a general discussion of prisoners' right to communicate with, and gain access to,
the courts, see D. RUDOVSKY, A. BRONSTEIN & E. KOREN, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 38-54
(1977).
66. 430 U.S. at 821-23.
67. Moeck v. Zajackowski, 541 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1976).
68. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (federal habeas corpus claim).
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government's interest in avoiding the risks and costs of such appear-
ances.
69
Although there is no specific statutory provision in Illinois provid-
ing that incarcerated persons have the capacity to litigate, the Illinois
courts have recognized for some time that persons serving a sentence in
any penal institution have the right to sue or be sued in Illinois courts
during their confinement. 70 Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that the capacity to bring suit is determined by the law of the
plaintiffs domicile,71 Illinois felons are also permitted to litigate in fed-
eral court. Although prisoners are not barred from bringing suit in Illi-
nois, the statute of limitations recognizes that imprisonment can be a
disability in bringing suit, and provides that the limitaton is tolled by
incarceration until two years after release.72
In Illinois, the convicted felon retains his right to execute legal in-
struments. He can make and enforce a contract73 and he has the power
to execute a will as long as he meets the statutory standards of capac-
ity.74
69. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declared in Moeck v.
Zajackowski, 541 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1976):
The due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which guaran-
tee access to the courts, do not grant a prisoner the right to attend court in order to carry
on the civil proceedings which he initiates.
There are doubtless situations in which fulfillment of a fundamental interest of a
prisoner so reasonably requires his being transported to a place outside the place of
confinement that it must outweigh the state's interest in avoiding the risks and expense of
such transportation; but we think the particular circumstances must be considered in
order to identify those situations.
We suggest. . . that the determination whether a prisoner's interest in being present
in court outweighs the state's relevant interests, is a discretionary one. Some of the rele-
vant considerations would seem to be: How substantial is the matter at issue? How
important is an early determination of the matter? Can the trial reasonably be delayed
until the prisoner is released? Have possible dispositive questions of law been decided?
Has the prisoner shown a probability of success? Is the testimony of the prisoner
needed? If needed, will a deposition be reasonably adequate? Is the prisoner repre-
sented? If not, is his presence reasonably necessary to present his case?
Id at 180-81 (emphasis added). See also Payne v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565
(1976) (right to appear to defend civil action discretionary with trial court).
70. McElyea v. Illinois, 7 Ill. Ct. Cl. 69 (1932).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 9, 22 (1977).
73. See Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 1030-31. Since Illinois does not have a civil
death statute for convicted felons, Illinois offenders necessarily retain contractual capacity accord-
ing to case law interpretations of other jurisdictions.
74. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 4-1 (1977) (capacity of testator defined). Cf. Dough-
erty v. State Sav., Loan & Trust Co., 292 Ill. 147, 126 N.E. 545 (1920) (where the testator was
found to be of sound mind, evidence of guilt of immoral conduct will not overturn will); Snell v.
Weldon, 239 Ill. 279, 87 N.E. 1022 (1909) (evidence of moral delinquency of testator is not
grounds for setting aside the will). Although these cases did not specifically involve criminal
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Conviction of a crime does not disqualify a person from testifying
as a witness in Illinois, 75 even if the crime was perjury. 76 However,
evidence of the conviction may be allowed at the trial for the purpose
of casting doubt on the credibility of the witness.77 The trial court is
not required to allow impeachment by prior conviction and, accord-
ingly, the decision of whether to admit the evidence for impeachment
purposes is within the discretion of the trial court judge.78 Conviction
of those crimes designated as infamous 79 are grounds for impeachment
of the witness.80 Even if the sentence is suspended, the record of the
prior conviction is admissible.8 1 This is also true if the person has been
pardoned8 2 or has an appeal of the conviction pending.8 3
The use of juvenile records to impeach testimony has even been
allowed in certain situations. 84 The decision of whether to admit the
record lies within the discretion of the trial court.8 5 The Illinois
Supreme Court has held that evidence of juvenile adjudications should
generally be deemed inadmissible, but that the judge may allow this
evidence for witnesses other than a criminal defendant if conviction of
the offense would be admissible to impeach the credibility of an adult,
and if the judge feels that the evidence is necessary for a fair determi-
nation on the issue of guilt or innocence.8 6
Prior to 1971, many Illinois decisions took the position that the
remoteness in time of the earlier conviction had no effect on its admis-
sibility.8 7 In the case of Illinois v. Montgomery,88 decided in 1971, the
Illinois Supreme Court indicated that the provisions of rule 609 of the
convictions for the complained acts, these acts could have subjected the testators to criminal fel-
ony sanctions if they had been prosecuted.
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (1977); id. ch. 51, § 1.
76. Simon v. Illinois, 150 Ill. 66, 36 N.E. 1019 (1894).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (1977); id. ch. 51, § i. See generally MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 84-90 (2d ed. 1972).
78. Illinois v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
79. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the definition of the
term "infamous."
80. Illinois v. Kirkpatrick, 413 Ill. 595, 110 N.E.2d 519 (1953).
81. Illinois v. Andrae, 295 Ill. 445, 129 N.E. 178 (1920).
82. Id Compare Illinois v. Shook, 35 II. 2d 597, 221 N.E.2d 290 (1966) (when a discharge of
conviction is by habeas corpus, such a conviction is thereby a nullity and inadmissible for later
impeachment purposes).
83. Illinois v. Spears, 83 Ill. App. 2d 18, 226 N.E.2d 67 (1967).
84. Illinois v. Norwood, 54 Ill. 2d 253, 258, 296 N.E.2d 852, 854 (1973) (disclosure of the
juvenile records of the witness allowed insofar as they might be relevant to defendant's claim that
the witness' testimony was attributable to lenient treatment which he had received or had been
promised).
85. Illinois v. Holsey, 30 Ill. App. 3d 716, 332 N.E. 2d 699 (1975).
86. Illinois v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E. 2d 695 (1971) (Illinois Supreme Court
adopts Uniform Rule of Evidence 609(d) as applicable to all future Illinois cases).
87. See, e.g., Illinois v. Aristotle, 131 Ill. App. 2d 175, 268 N.E. 2d 227 (1971) (twenty years);
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Uniform Rules of Evidence should be followed in the future. This rule
prohibits the introduction of evidence of the commission of crime for
impeachment purposes if more than ten years have elapsed since con-
viction or release from confinement, whichever is later.89
In light of the rules governing impeachment, the criminal defend-
ant with prior convictions is faced with a dilemma. If he takes the
stand to testify in his own defense, the prosecution is at liberty to intro-
duce evidence of prior criminality to cast doubt upon his credibility as
a witness. Although limiting instructions are given to the jury regard-
ing the purposes for which this testimony may be used, there is always
a danger that the jurors may take the evidence as proof of guilt rather
than as merely bearing on veracity. On the other hand, if the defend-
ant elects not to testify on his own behalf, he risks the danger that the
jury will infer guilt from his silence. There does not seem to be any
satisfactory solution to the problem, so defense counsel must weigh
both sides of the issue in making the decision of whether to use the
defendant as a witness.
Persons with felony convictions are not barred from jury service
per se in Illinois.90 Nor is a prior conviction grounds for a juror chal-
lenge for cause.9 1 One of the qualifications required of jurors, however,
is that they be "of fair character, [and] of approved integrity .... "92
There are no reported Illinois cases at the appellate level which address
the issue of whether an individual with a prior felony conviction meets
the requisite character standard. Presumably,'the question would have
to be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular
offense and individual involved. In any event, statutes with provisions
similar to Illinois' "fair character/approved integrity" criterion have
survived constitutional challenges before the Supreme Court on
grounds of vagueness and violation of equal protection as applied. 93 In
addition, the Supreme Court has held that states are free to require
jurors to possess "good intelligence, sound judgment and fair charac-
ter"94 and may bar a person from jury service if he is not an "upright"
Illinois v. Smith, 90 Ill. App. 2d 310, 234 N.E.2d 31 (1967), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971)
(twenty-two years).
88. 47 111. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
89. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE § 609(b).
90. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1977) (qualifications of petit jurors) and id. § 4 (those
exempted from jury duty).
91. Id § 14 (causes for challenges of jurors).
92. Id §2.
93. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320
(1970).
94. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
citizen. 95
Conviction of an infamous crime precludes an individual from
acting as executor of a will96 and acting as an administrator of an es-
tate.97 In addition, a felony conviction is cause for removal of an exec-
utor, administrator, administrator to collect, guardian to collect,
guardian, conservator, or conservator to collect. 98 Finally, it is possible
that a prior criminal conviction could preclude a person from being a
class representative in a class action proceeding. 99
The Right to Hold Office
A person who has been convicted of a crime also suffers a disabil-
ity with respect to holding a public office. In Illinois, a person guilty of
a felony or of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime is ineligible to
hold an office created by the constitution. 00 By statute, this disability
lasts until the completion of the sentence.' 0'
According to the Illinois statute, "office" is a term of art. The leg-
islative intent was to include positions which involve substantive pol-
icy-making functions as opposed to those which are primarily
ministerial in character. 02 Included within the meaning of the term
are those executive, judicial, and legislative offices created by the 1970
constitution and offices of the state, units of local government, and
school districts. 0 3 The disability extends to convicted persons seeking
to be delegates to a constitutional convention. 1°4
The statutes also provide for removal of a person should he be
convicted during his term of office.10 5 The position then becomes va-
cant due to ineligibility upon conviction of a felony or infamous crime
95. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 6-13 (1977).
97. Id § 9-1.
98. Id § 23-2.
99. See Folding Cartons, Inc. v. American Can Co., 79 F.R.D. 698 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
100. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-5(b) (1977).
102. ILL. CONST. art IV, § 2(e) (Smith-Hurd 1970) (Helman & Whelan, Constitutional Com-
mentary).
103. Id art. XII, § 1. Under the statutes, conviction of an infamous crime also renders a
person ineligible for municipal office, school district office, or aldermanic position. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 102, § 120 (1977).
104. Livingston v. Ogilvie, 43 Ill. 2d 9, 250 N.E.2d 138 (1969).
105. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 25-2 (1977) which provides that:
Every elective office shall become vacant on the happening of either of the following
events. . . . His conviction of an infamous crime. ...
See also id ch. 102, § 120 which provides that:
Any person holding office. . . convicted .. of an infamous crime. . . shall be, upon
conviction, ineligible to continue in such office.
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and, because of policy considerations, the vacancy is to be filled accord-
ing to local law, by appointment or election, 0 6 even during the pending
appeal.'0 7 Absent a reversal, 0 8 the disability to hold public office con-
tinues throughout the lifetime of the individual if convicted of an infa-
mous crime' 0 9 or until completion of the sentence if convicted of a
felony.1 The statute provides for reinstatement of the officer for the
duration of the term upon reversal of the conviction."'
Domestic Rights
The loss of certain domestic rights may be triggered by a felony
conviction. In Illinois, conviction of a felony is grounds for dissolution
of marriage." 2 An individual's parental rights also can be affected by a
finding of guilt. In most instances, the natural parent of a child must
consent before the child can legally be adopted, but in certain in-
stances, obtaining the parent's permission is unnecessary. An illustra-
tion of the latter situation is where the natural parent is found to be
unfit.' '3 Taken alone, a felony conviction is not grounds to warrant the
adoption of a child without parental consent, 14 but conviction may be
submitted as evidence on the subject of fitness." -5
One of the requirements for being an adoptive parent in Illinois is
that the person seeking to adopt be "reputable." 16 Cases involving the
issue of whether a convicted felon possesses the requisite character
traits are few, but in at least one instance the fact that an applicant to
adopt a child had committed forgery was deemed to be a proper
ground for the denial of his petition.' 17
Property Rights
Forfeiture of property rights upon conviction of a crime is against
the public policy of the state." 18 The Illinois Constitution specifically
106. Id ch. 46, § 25-2.
107. Illinois ex rel Taborski v. Illinois Appellate Court, 50 II. 2d 336, 278 N.E.2d 796 (1972);
Illinois ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 I11. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168 (1958).
108. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 120 (1977).
109. Illinois ex rel. Symonds v. Gualano, 97 Ill. App. 2d 248, 254, 240 N.E.2d 467, 470 (1968).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-5(b) (1977).
111. Id ch. 102, § 120.
112. Id. ch. 40, § 401(2).
113. Id § 1510.
114. Ornstead v. Kleba, 37 111. App. 3d 163, 166, 345 N.E.2d 714, 717 (1976).
115. Townsend v. Curtis, 15 Ill. App. 3d 209, 212, 303 N.E.2d 566, 568-69 (1973).
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1502(a) (1977).
117. In re Berkowitz, 88 Ill. App. 2d 1, 232 N.E.2d 72 (1967) (abstract).
118. Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 I11. 37, 83 N.E. 542 (1907).
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prohibits forfeiture of one's estate as a penalty for conviction. 19 The
only property right affected by conviction in Illinois is the right of in-
heritance where the heir is convicted of murdering the decedent. 20
Also, a convicted murderer cannot receive insurance or annuity death
benefits from his victim' 2' nor enjoy the right of survivorship in prop-
erty held in joint tenancy with his victim. 22
Employment Opportunities
Licensed Employment
Persons who have been convicted of felonies often find that their
record has a negative effect on employment. In occupations where li-
censing is involved, engaging in a particular type of employment is
considered to be a privilege granted by the state rather than a right. 123
Entrance to and continued participation in a licensed occupation is
conditioned upon the applicant's ability to meet the criteria prescribed
by the legislature.
Many fields of employment, ranging from the traditional profes-
sions of medicine 24 and law 25 to semi-skilled and unskilled trades
such as barbering 26 and race track employment, 27 are subject to state
licensing. In Illinois, the effect of a felony conviction differs somewhat
from occupation to occupation. Conviction of a felony may be grounds
for denial, suspension, or revocation of certain registration certificates
if the individual has not been "sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant
public trust.' 28 Decisions as to whether an applicant has been "suffi-
119. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 2-6 (1977). A decedent's murderer shall not inherit from
him or acquire any interest in the decedent's estate. Rather, the murderer is treated as if he pre-
deceased the decedent.
121. Bailey v. Retirement Bd., 51 111. App. 3d 433, 366 N.E.2d 966 (1977).
122. Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
123. See notes 124-32 and accompanying text infra.
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 4403 (1977).
125. Id ch. 13, § 1.
126. Id ch. 111, § 1601.
127. Id ch. 8, § 37-15.
128. See id ch. 73, § 1065.49(h) (insurance agent, broker, or solicitor); id ch. 111, § 1218(f)
(architect); id § 1818(a) (beauty culturist and apprentice); id § 2222(12) (dental surgeon, dental
hygienist); id § 2824(b) (embalmer); id § 3027(a) (horseshoer); id § 3420(3) (nurse or practical
nurse); id § 3814(a) (optometrist); id § 4216(7) (physical therapist); id § 4433(2) (physician); id
§ 4922(0 (podiatrist); id § 5124(3) (engineer); id § 5316(l) (psychologist); id § 6120(b) (certified
short-hand reporter); id § 6315(o (social worker); id § 6913(2) (veterinarian).
Conviction of a felony alone may be grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation of other
registration certificates, without regard to the licensee's rehabilitation. See, e.g., id ch. 8, § 2 59(e)
(bull lessor); id § 310(0 (petshop owner, dog dealer, kennel operator, or operator of pound or
animal shelter); id ch. 43, § 155 (holder of liquor license); id ch. 56 1/2, § 242.2(d) (horse slaugh-
terer, processor, breeder, and raiser); id. ch. 57 1/2, § 4(a) (operators of foreign exchange); id ch.
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ciently rehabilitated" presumably would lie with the Illinois Depart-
ment of Registration and Education. This department is authorized to
conduct hearings on proceedings to issue, revoke, and suspend licenses,
certificates, or authorities of persons in occupations requiring registra-
tion. 129
In other licensed trades or occupations, conviction alone is enough
to preclude licensing or registration. Depending upon the specific type
of employment involved, denial of a license may result from conviction
of a felony, 30 a crime involving moral turpitude, 13 1 a crime involving
either a felony or moral turpitude, 32 or simply of crime in general. 133
Other fields subject to licensing make the granting of the permit
conditional upon the applicant's being "of good moral character"' 34 or
"of good business reputation."'' 35 Evidence of a felony conviction may
be considered in determining character and reputation, but conviction
alone does not preclude licensing or registration. 136 Some statutes pro-
viding for licensing or registration require the applicant to disclose
whether he has ever been convicted of a felony, but do not indicate
what effect this would have on the issuance of the certificate. 37
While the effect of a felony conviction on obtaining a license is
admittedly uncertain because of the amount of discretion given to the
Illinois Department of Registration and Education and its subsidiary
committees, there are some positive signs for the ex-offender. The Illi-
nois State Teacher Certification Board, for example, has adopted the
111, § 2813(b) (funeral director); id. § 3620(e) (nursing home administrator); id § 4011 (reciprocal
registration of pharmacists); id. § 4012 (pharmacist apprentice); id § 5521(a) (public accountant).
129. Id ch. 127, § 60(6).
130. Id ch. 16, § 53 (bail bondsman); id ch. 114, § 352(2) (operator of business renting safety
deposit boxes, safes, vaults).
131. Id ch. 16 1/2, § 255(2) (operator of financial planning and management business); id ch.
32, § 360.7(4) (founder of non-profit consumer credit counseling corporation).
132. Id ch. 111, § 2415(C) (polygraph examiner); id § 2611 (d) (private detective, unless dis-
charged from sentence more than twenty years old).
Other licenses are similarly denied to those convicted either of a felony or crimes involving
dishonesty, fraud, or misstatement. See, e.g., id § 7116(7) (water well and pump installation con-
tractors); id ch. 144, § 151 (operator of private business school).
133. Id ch. 8, § 37-15(c)(I) (racetrack worker).
134. Id ch. 13, § 2 (attorney); id ch. 16 1/2, § 255(I) (operator of financial planning and
management business); id ch. 95 1/2, § 6-402(a) (operator of driver training school); id ch. I 11.
§ 901 (operator of private employment agency); id § 1612(b) (student barber); id § 1614(b) (ap-
prentice barber); id § 1617(b) (registered barber); id § 1626(d) (operator of barber school or col-
lege); id § 5904 (sanitarian); id § 6506(b) (structural engineer); id ch. 122, § 21-1 (teacher).
135. Id ch. 16 1/2, § 40(c) (community currency exchange operator); id ch. 11I, § 304(a)
(grain dealer); id § 901 (private employment agency operator).
136. See, e.g., id §§ 204, 1612.
137. Id ch. 34, § 6304(c) (license to operate a dance hall outside a city's limits); id § 6707 (tree
expert's license).
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following rules for certification of persons who have been convicted of
a felony:
A. Each case must be reviewed separately. The type of offense in-
volved will affect the character decision; obviously some offenses
(and felonies) are of a more serious nature than others.
B. The purpose of criminal penalties must be considered. It is the
overwhelming view of experts in the various professions of the
law that the purpose of criminal penalties is not only to punish,
but to rehabilitate the individual. To automatically deny a per-
son a privilege enjoyed by others is to tell that person that he
will never be looked upon as being rehabilitated and that the
stigma of his offense will forever be attached to him to prevent
him from becoming an accepted and useful member of society.
Such a drastic decision should not be taken lightly. It certainly
should never be an automatic decision which does not give a
person the opportunity to prove that he has overcome a defect in
his past record.
Therefore, in handling application where there has been a criminal
conviction on the part of the applicant, the State Teacher Certifica-
tion Board will:
1) not automatically reject an applicant with a criminal convic-
tion record.
2) take into consideration the gravity of the offense; i e., misde-
meanor, felony, infamous crime together with the circum-
stances under which it occured; i.e., background and age of
the person at the time of the offense.
3) allow the applicant to provide evidence of good character
and rehabilitation.
4) render a decision as to good character by weighing the evi-
dence of bad character (the criminal conviction) against that
of good character and rehabilitation.
5) require a waiting period of one year from the time the sen-
tence or probation period for the criminal offense ends
before an application for certification will be considered.
This will allow adequate time for determining rehabilitation
on the part of the applicant. 38
Because counties139 and municipalities' 40 also have the power to license
138. STATE OF ILLINOIS, OFFICE OF EDUCATION, RULES AND REGULATIONS TO GOVERN THE
CERTIFICATION OF TEACHERS, Rule 12.21 (1977).
139. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 421 (1977) (county authority to license persons engag-
ing in the business of providing entertainment or recreation, of accommodating house trailers,
house cars or tents, or providing lodging of transients); id § 6301 (county authority to license
operation of dance halls or road houses).
140. Id ch. 24, §§ 11-42-1 to 11-42-12 (auctioneers; private detectives and detective agencies;
money changers; bankers; brokers; barbers and barber shops; keepers or owners of lumber yards,
lumber storehouses, livery stables, public scales, ice cream parlors, coffee houses, florists, billiard
tables, bowling alleys, and secondhand and junk stores; runners for cabs, buses, and hotels; hawk-
ers; peddlers; cabdrivers; porters; employees of shows, places for eating and amusement, packing
houses, and tanneries; breweries, garages, shops, laundries, bathing beaches, athletic contests and
exhibitions carried on for gain; holders of liquor licenses).
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and regulate certain occupations and activities, local ordinances should
be carefully checked in specific cases.
Public Employment
Convicted criminals face similar statutory barriers with regard to
public employment.' 4' In Illinois, the State Personnel Code provides
for the rejection of candidates for civil service positions who, among
other things, "have been guilty of infamous or disgraceful conduct." 142
Although the application form does include questions pertaining to
previous convictions, the Illinois Department of Personnel has indi-
cated that in processing the applications normally no action is taken to
screen out or reject individuals with felony records. 143 The decision to
accept or reject the individual is left to the particular agency to which
the individual's name may be referred after qualifying in an open com-
petitive examination. Standards may vary since there are no uniform
guidelines, but the Illinois Department of Personnel has indicated that,
except for security-type positions, individuals are not typically disquali-
fied for previous arrest records. Specifically, with regard to felonies,
the agencies presumably take into account the type of position applied
for, the nature of the offense, when the offense occurred, and other rele-
vant factors. 44 Illinois statutes, however, provide that criminal records
automatically preclude employment as a state police officer 45 and may
preclude employment as a deputy sheriff of a county police department
or corrections officer in the Cook County sheriffs department if it is
determined to be detrimental to the applicant's ability to carry out his
duty. 46
In the private sector, the convicted felon may also face substantial
discrimination in hiring. Several studies have indicated that any prior
conviction would severely limit an individual's employment opportuni-
ties. 47 However, a significant study, reported in 1976,148 has shown
that there is an increasing awareness among business executives of the
141. See notes 100-11 and accompanying text supra regarding elected or appointed positions
of public trust.
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b108b.4 (1977).
143. Personal correspondence from W. Peura, Manager, Division of Selection and Employ-
ment Services, State of Illinois Department of Personnel, Sept. 21, 1978 (on file with author).
144. Id
145. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 307.9 (1977).
146. Id ch. 125, § 58.
147. Melichercik, Employment Problems of Former Offenders, 1 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE
AsS'N J. 43 (1956); Wyle, The Employment of Released Offenders, 25 PROBATION 10 (1946).
148. Jensen & Giegold, Finding Jobs/or Ex-Offenders: A Study of Employers' Attitudes, 14
AM. Bus. L.J. 195 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Jensen & Giegold].
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problems a former conviction raises in j ob-seeking. Of the 209 respon-
dents to this survey, ninety-seven percent said company policy did not
categorically forbid hiring convicted persons. 49 The dominant opinion
seems to be that employing former offenders provides an opportunity
to help solve the nation's crime problem without threatening the corpo-
rate structure. 150 While there are still informal barriers, business lead-
ers are beginning to take the initiative in this area.' 5 '
In any event, hiring practices and policies with regard to persons
with a criminal record are far from uniform. Eighty-two percent of the
businesses surveyed in the 1976 study had no company-wide policy. 52
Most used a case-by-case approach and took into consideration the
type of offense committed and its relationship to the position being
sought,' 53 the length of time that had elapsed since the offense,' 54 and
the age of the individual at the time the crime was committed. 155
There have been several constitutional challenges to employer dis-
crimination againt ex-offenders, but these suits all have been decided
on racial discrimination grounds. In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc. ,156
a federal district court held that title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964157 prohibited employers from absolutely barring job applicants
from employment on the basis of arrest records. The court declared
that the company's policy resulted in racially discriminatory hiring
practices because a disproportionate number of blacks were disquali-
fied.' 58 However, Litton was enjoined only from seeking information
concerning prior arrests which did not result in conviction.
One court has gone beyond the resulting racial discrimination po-
sition 59 and held that a state law which absolutely barred convicted
felons from civil service employment 60 was a violation of the equal
149. Id at 203.
150. Id at 197.
151. An example of this is the National Alliance of Businessmen's program to assist the ex-
offender. See NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1979, at 10.
152. Jensen & Giegold, supra note 148, at 202.
153. For example, hospitals are reluctant to hire persons convicted of drug-related offenses
while trucking and transportation companies often reject individuals with larceny convictions. Id.
at 203.
154. Id at 204.
155. Id
156. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aft'd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e.17 (1976).
158. 316 F. Supp. at 403. Accord, Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir.
1975).
159. The racial discrimination claims were dismissed by the court for failure to first exhaust
administrative remedies). Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 577-78 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
160. IOWA CODE § 365.17(5) (1971) (renumbered and transferred to id. § 400.17 (1976)).
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protection clause. In Butts v. Nichols, 16 1 the court first found that no
"compelling state interest" was required to uphold the statute's consti-
tutionality because classification based upon a criminal record is not
inherently suspect. 162 After declaring the "rational basis" test to be the
correct standard to be applied, the court stated that although "the State
could logically prohibit and refuse employment in certain positions
where felony conviction would directly reflect on the felon's job qualifi-
cations," 163 the across-the-board prohibition did not pass constitutional
muster because it was both over- and under-inclusive. 64 The Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fifth District, in City of Cairo v. Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission,165 followed the reasoning of Gregory to
find that removal of an applicant's name from an employment eligibil-
ity list solely because of his arrest record violated the racial discrimina-
tion provision of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act. 166
In 1960, however, the Supreme Court upheld a New York stat-
ute 167 that automatically excluded ex-offenders from employment as
officers of a waterfront labor organization. In De Veau v. Braisted,168
the evidence showed that the legislation was enacted after a compre-
hensive investigation confirmed that there was a nexus between corrupt
hiring practices on the waterfront and the criminal connections of the
persons doing the hiring. The Court indicated that it would sustain a
blanket disability against persons with criminal convictions only when
a substantial legislative finding links past criminal acts with present
corruptness in a specified area. 169
Further bars to ex-offender employment exist in positions which
require bonding. 70 Many fidelity insurance companies refuse to bond
161. 381 F. Supp. 573, 578 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
162. Id at 579, citing Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1190 (1st Cir. 1970). The com-
pelling state interest, to be applied where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are in-
volved, and the more easily satisfied rational basis test, to be used where such interests are not
involved, are compared and discussed in J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 525-27 (2d ed. 1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-
1003 (1978).
163. 381 F. Supp. at 580.
164. Accord, Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Conn. 1977).
165. 21 111. App. 3d 358, 365, 315 N.E.2d 344, 349 (1974).
166. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 853(a) (1977).
167. 1953 N.Y. LAWS 882, § 8.
168. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
169. Id at 159-60.
170. In Illinois, the following trades and occupations, among others, require by law the post-
ing of a surety bond: see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, § 43 (1977) (manufacturers of butter and cheese);
id § 141 (merchants and dealers of fresh fruits and vegetables); id ch. 23, § 5106 (professional
fund raisers); id ch. 32, § 453 (officers, employees, and agents handling funds or property of agri-
cultural cooperatives); id § 496.17 (credit union employees); id § 747 (officers and employees of
savings and loan institutions); id § 1027 (officers and employees of development credit corpora-
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persons with criminal records, and low-cost blanket bonds do not cover
employees with criminal records.' 7'
Pensions, Insurance, and Employment Benefits
Public employees in many different categories lose their right to
retirement benefits if they are convicted of a felony related to their em-
ployment. 172 However, the statutes do not operate to deprive an indi-
vidual of his pension once the right has become vested, nor do they
preclude the right to a refund of contributions accumulated in the fund
at the time of the felony conviction.
A convicted criminal may find it impossible to obtain life insur-
ance while he is imprisoned, and the disability often continues after he
is released. 73 If insurance is obtained, a conviction does not generally
invalidate the agreement unless specifically provided for in the policy,
so that the language of the insurance contract is important. The Illinois
Supreme Court has held that life insurance proceeds were recoverable
even when the death resulted from the insured's own criminal activ-
ity.' 74 However, the Illinois Insurance Code provides that "[t]he com-
pany shall be liable [on accident and health insurance policies] for any
loss to which a contributing cause was the insured's commission of an
attempt to commit a felony."' 175
Automobile insurance may also be difficult for a convicted person
to obtain. 176 In Illinois, conviction or forfeiture of bail (within the pre-
ceding thirty-six months for any felony and certain other offenses relat-
ing to the operation of a motor vehicle) is grounds for the cancellation
of the person's automobile insurance policy. 77 However, an insured
who wishes to appeal the cancellation has a statutory right to do so.' 78
tions); id ch. 55, § 7 (ferry operators); id ch. 73, § 1065.46(a) (brokers); id ch. 99, § 34 (notaries
public); id ch. 11, § 103 (commission merchants).
171. Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies To ward Probationers and Parolees, 21 FED. PROB.
36 (1957).
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, § 2-156 (1977) (general assembly); id. 3-147 (police officers);
id § 4-138 (fire fighters); id § 7-219 (municipal employees); id § 9-235 (county employees); id
§ 11-230 (laborers); id § 12-191 (park district employees); id § 13-221 (sanitary district employ-
ees); id § 14-149 (state employees); id § 15-187 (state university employees); id § 16-199 (teach-
ers); id § 18-163 (judges); id § 19-103 (house of corrections employees); id § 19-203 (public
library employees).
173. Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at I110-11.
174. Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., I1I Ill. 2d 227, 230, 142 N.E.2d 5, 7-8 (1957)
(insured killed by accidental means while attempting to engage in arson).
175. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 969.24 (1977).
176. See generally Collateral Consequences, supra note 3, at 1121-24.
177. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755.19(0(5) (1977).
178. Id § 755.23.
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Unlike some states, Illinois does not suspend worker's compensa-
tion benefits upon conviction, but unemployment compensation is not
available to any person discharged from employment because of the
commission of a felony in connection with his work. 179
Other Rights Affected by Conviction
In addition to the other forfeitures suffered, a convicted person
loses the right to possess firearms or ammunition for five years after his
conviction or release, 180 as well as the right to enlist in the Illinois State
Guard or Naval Militia.' 8 ' If the conviction results from one of several
offenses involving a motor vehicle, the individual's license to drive is
also revoked. 82
RESTORATION OF RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
The restoration of civil rights in Illinois is governed primarily by
the Unified Code of Corrections. 83 Under the statutory provisions,
voting rights are restored upon release from imprisonment. 84 Eligibil-
ity to hold public office returns following the completion of sentence. 85
With regard to the restoration of license rights and privileges, Illi-
nois has taken a progressive position. By statutory mandate, 86 once an
individual's prison sentence is completed, all licenses, except drivers'
licenses, which were revoked or suspended because of conviction are
automatically restored, unless the Illinois Department of Registration
and Education can affirmatively demonstrate-after an investigation
and hearing-that restoration is not in the public interest. 187 This pro-
vision shifts the burden of proof from the applicant to the department.
The committing court is also authorized to issue, upon discharge
from incarceration, parole, probation, or anytime afterward, a certifi-
cate indicating that the individual's sentence has been satisfactorily
completed and that the individual's behavior after conviction has war-
ranted issuance of the order. 8 8 The order may be entered on motion of
179. Id ch. 48, § 432c.
180. Id ch. 38, §§ 83-2(a), 83-4(2)(ii).
181. Id ch. 129, § 251.
182. Id ch. 95 1/2, §§ 6-205(a)(1) to 6-206(a)(20).
183. ld ch. 38, § 1005-5-5.
184. Id. § 1005-5-5(c). See notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra.
185. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-5(b) (1977). See notes 100-11 and accompanying text
supra.
186. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-5(d) (1977).
187. Id.
188. ld §§ 1005-5-5(e), (f).
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the defendant, the state, or the court itself when the court believes the
issuance would assist in rehabilitation and be consistent with public
welfare. 89
CONCLUSION
Only a small percentage of convicted felons are ever incarcerated.
On the other hand, every Illinois citizen who suffers a felony conviction
is subject to at least some disabilities regardless of whether a prison
sentence is imposed. Freedom is definitely not the only issue involved
in the final disposition of the case. Both the potential felon and his
attorney should be aware of the significance of these collateral conse-
quences which may result if there is a felony conviction.
189. Id § 1005-5-5(e).
